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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
RONNIE C. BYRD,

Case No. 950399-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction for two
counts of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, 3rd
degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i)
(Supp. 1996) (a copy of the judgment is attached hereto as
Addendum A ) , in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy,
presiding.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Whether the prosecutor's use during trial of

Defendant/Appellant Ronnie C. Byrd's ("Byrd") post-arrest silence
violated his right to remain silent and prejudiced his right to a
fair trial.
STANDARD OF REVIEW;

Because the issue concerns the

violation of a constitutional right, it is a question of law with
respect to which this Court will not defer in any degree to the
trial court but will review the trial court's determinations for
1

correctness.
2.

State v. P^n^r 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).

Whether the trial court erred in denying Byrd's motion

for a new trial where the state breached its duty to supplement
discovery responses relevant to Byrd's defense.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

A ruling denying a motion for a new

trial will be reversed if the trial court abused its discretion.
State v. Menzies, 845 P.2d 220, 224 (Utah 1992).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
At trial Byrd objected to the state's examination of an
officer and the state's cross-examination of Byrd concerning
Byrd's post-arrest silence during police interrogations.

The

examinations violated Byrd's Fifth Amendment and due process
rights.

Record on Appeal (,fR.M) at 169-87; 484; 528-30; 600-01;

659-60.
In addition, Byrd requested a new trial based on the state's
introduction of surprise testimony that directly conflicted with
earlier information provided by the state during pretrial
discovery.

(R. 169-87.)

The surprise testimony compromised

Byrd's credibility to the jury. (R. 169-87; 460-469.)
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following rules, statutes and constitutional provisions
will be determinative of the issues on appeal:
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 -- Discovery.
Utah Cons

art. I, § 7.

Utah Const, art. I, § 1 2 .
2

U.S. Const, amend. V.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached
Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below.
On October 14, 1993, Byrd was charged by Information with
two counts of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance,
third degree felonies in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-378(2)(a)(i) (1953 as amended).

(R. 7-8.)

After Byrd engaged in

pretrial discovery (R. 13-14), the jury trial commenced.
74-76; 265-671.)

(R. 68;

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found

Byrd guilty on both counts and Byrd requested a new trial raising
the issues set forth herein.

(R. 121-22; 169-87.)

The trial

court denied Byrd's request (R. 207-08) and entered a judgment
sentencing Byrd to serve indeterminate, concurrent terms at the
Utah State Prison not to exceed five years.

(R. 201-02; 207-08.)

Byrd is incarcerated at the Utah State Prison and appeals from
the final judgment.

(R. 209.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Prior to the trial in this matter, Byrd's counsel engaged in
pretrial discovery, which included interviewing officers who
arrested Byrd and investigated the events leading up to his
arrest for two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance.

(R. 13-14; 132.)

Officer Thomas Scott Grant
3

("Grant") disclosed to defense counsel and testified at trial
that on October 12, 1993, officers were engaged in a clandestine
operation at Pioneer Park in Salt Lake City, Utah.

(R. 357-66.)

Grant observed the following events at the park through a
telescope and video camera from the second floor of a building
next to the park: a car pulled up to a curb along the park, a
pedestrian approached the car, the car occupant(s) and the
pedestrian apparently engaged in a conversation, the first
pedestrian left, -^nd a second pedestrian approached the car,
twice handed items through the front passenger-side window of the
car, and took what appeared to be cash from an occupant in the
car.

(R. 369-73.)
When the car pulled away and left the park Grant notified

other officers that he had observed a drug transaction between a
pedestrian and the front passenger of the car and he described
the car to the officers.

(R. 410; 475-77.)

Officers Martin

Kaufman ("Kaufman") and David Thurgood ("Thurgood") followed the
car for a number of blocks from Pioneer Park, briefly lost it in
traffic, located it again, and initiated a stop of the car.
410-12; 477-480.)

(R.

The officers testified that while they

observed the car, none of the occupants made a furtive motion
toward the floor of the car and/or toward the front passenger
seat area.

(R. 428-29; 414-15.)

Three individuals were in the stopped car.
front passenger seat.

(R. 412-13.)

Byrd was in the

Thurgood approached the car,

asked Byrd to jet out, lead him to an area away from the car and
4

arrested him.

(R. 415; 481-83.)

After Byrd's arrest, Thurgood searched only the front
passenger seat area of the car and found two items tucked under
that seat.
heroine.

The items were later determined to be cocaine and
(R. 416-18; 484-86.)

During a pretrial interview

Kaufman disclosed that he did not search any other area of the
car and neither he nor Thurgood searched or arrested the other
car occupants.

(R. 419-22; 443-44; see also 445-47.) The

officers allowed the other car occupants to drive away without
being questioned or searched. (R. 415-16; 442-44; 486.)
The state and the officers did not supplement discovery
responses or correct any misrepresentations that were provided to
the defense during pretrial discovery concerning the events
leading up to Byrd's arrest.

(R. 420-22.)

Thus, counsel for

Byrd proceeded with a defense that (1) either the driver or the
back-seat passenger, or both, were the actual parties to the
alleged drug transaction (R. 343-50), and (2) the drugs found in
the car belonged to the owner/driver or other occupant, and were
placed in the car before the events at the park occurred. (R.
349-50; 461-62.)

Byrd's counsel introduced the defense theory

to the jury during opening statements, calling the attention of
the jurors to evidence that would show there was no search of the
car other than the right front passenger seat, that all three
passengers would have had access to the only area of the car that
was searched, and that the other two occupants were not questioned, searched, or investigated but were released shortly after the
5

officers stopped the car.

(R. 348-50; see also 438-43.)

The defense was surprised at trial when Kaufman testified
that he conducted an exhaustive search of the car after Thurgood
completed his minimal search of the passenger area of the car.
(R. 131-33; 416-17.)

Such testimony served to compromise the

defense's credibility to the jury and to invalidate the defense's
theory and trial strategy.

(R. 465-66.)

In addition, during the trial Thurgood testified on direct
examination that immediately after Byrd was arrested, Thurgood
advised Byrd of his rights per Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and asked Byrd if he wanted to make a statement.
483; 486-87.)

(R.

According to Thurgood, Byrd said "yes," but

"declined" to comment in response to police interrogations.
483-88; 529-32.)

(R.

Counsel for Byrd immediately objected on Fifth

Amendment and constitutional due process grounds to the
prosecution's line of questions concerning Byrd's refusal to
respond to officers' questions and made a motion for a mistrial.
(R. 528-29.)

However, clear implications were already before the

jury -- Byrd's silence and his failure to deny involvement in the
alleged drug transaction implicated him in the charged offenses.
During Byrd's cross-examination, the prosecutor again raised
the issue of Byrd's silence in the wake of the Miranda warnings.
(R. 600-01.)

The prosecutor asked Byrd the following:

(By the prosecutor) Q: Do you remember the officer
testifying that when he gave you the Miranda warnings
you said, "Yes I'll talk to you"?
(By Byrd) A:

I remember him saying that.
6

Q: Do you remember him giving you the Miranda
warnings?
A:

I can't remember if he did or not.

Q: So it could have been or it could not have been;
that's what you are saying?
A:

I just know[,] I didn't talk to him.

Q: You certainly did not say anything to him about the
driver buying these drugs, did you?
A:

I didn't say anything about no drugs, period.

Q: And certainly you didn't want to protect these
guys, did you?
(R. 600-01; 659-660.) Byrd's counsel made a request for a new
trial based on prosecutorial misconduct in violation of Byrd's
constitutional rights.

(R. 171-87.)

The jury found Byrd guilty

on both counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance
(R. 662-63), and thereafter, the trial court denied Byrd's
request.

(R. 207-08.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

During trial, the state made repeated references to Byrd's
post-arrest silence in the face of officer interrogations.

The

state made its first reference through the state's witness on
direct examination, and the second reference through Byrd on
cross-examination.

References at trial to a defendant's post-

arrest silence are violative of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the federal constitution and article I, sections 7
and 12 of the Utah constitution.

7

The state's duty to supplement information provided to the
defense during pretrial discovery is ongoing and consistent with
a defendant's right to a fair trial.

In this matter, during

pretrial discovery the state arranged for Byrd's counsel to
interview Kaufman concerning the events surrounding Byrd's
arrest.

In preparing Byrd's defense, counsel relied on Kaufman's

pretrial representations that the officers did not conduct a
complete search of the car.

At trial Kaufman's testimony

contrasted with the information he provided to Byrd's counsel
during pre-trial discovery. The state's failure to advise Byrd's
counsel of the change in the officer's testimony compromised the
defense's credibility to the jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE STATE'S INTRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE IN ITS
CASE-IN-CHIEF OF BYRD'S POST-ARREST SILENCE AND THE USE
OF POST-ARREST SILENCE BY THE STATE DURING CROSSEXAMINATION TO IMPEACH BYRD VIOLATED STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF DUE PROCESS AND
PROHIBITIONS AGAINST COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION.
The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution provides:
"No person shall . . . be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself."

The Miranda warnings are a

prophylactic means of safeguarding the Fifth Amendment rights,
and require "that a person taken into custody be advised
immediately that he has the right to remain silent, that anything
he says may be used against him, and that he has a right to
retained or appointed counsel before submitting to

8

interrogation."

Dovle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).

Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution likewise provides
that an accused "shall not be compelled to give evidence against
himself.nl
In Dovle, 426 U.S. at 610, the Unites States Supreme Court
ruled that prosecutorial comment for impeachment purposes on a
defendant's silence is violative of the Fifth Amendment and the
due process provision of the federal constitution,2 and is
grounds for the reversal of a conviction.

In that case, the

prosecutor attempt-ed to undercut the defendants7 exculpatory
explanation for a drug sale by asking them during crossexamination why they had not reported their version of the events
to the officer at the time of their arrests.

The Court held that

use of the defendants' post-arrest silence after receiving
Miranda warnings was impermissible.

"Silence in the wake of

[Miranda! warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's
exercise of [those] rights.

Thus, every post-arrest silence is

insolubly ambiguous because of what the state is required to
advise the person arrested."

Id. at 617.

1

In determining whether Byrd's rights under Article I, section 12
were violated, Byrd is not urging that the analysis under the Utah
Constitution is different from an analysis under the federal
constitution. See State v. Mace, 295 Adv. Rep. 44, 45 (Utah 1996).
2

The Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution provides,
"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ."
Art. I, sec. 7 of the Utah Constitution
guarantees fundamental fairness at trial, and for purposes of this appeal
the analysis of that provision is not different from the analysis under
the federal counterpart.
9

Although Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that
silence will carry no penalty, such an assurance is implicit to
persons receiving the warnings.

" [I]t would be fundamentally

unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested
person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation
subsequently offered at trial."

Id. at 618.

In State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah 1981), the Utah
Supreme Court reversed a conviction where the prosecutor drew
attention to the defendant's post-arrest silence.

Id. at 147.

Such conduct constituted prosecutorial misconduct.
In State v. Reves, 861 P.2d 1055 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), this
Court identified four factors that must be considered in
determining whether post-arrest silence has prejudiced a
defendant.

The factors are the following:

(1) whether the jury would "naturally and necessarily
construe" the comment as referring to defendant's
silence: (2) whether there was overwhelming evidence of
defendant's guilt; (3) whether the reference was
isolated; and (4) whether the trial court instructed
the jury not to draw any adverse presumption from
defendant's decision not to testify.
Id. at 1057.

Consideration of the factors in this matter compels

the determination that the prosecutor's questions concerning and
references to Byrd's post-arrest silence prejudiced Byrd.
During the state's case-in-chief, the prosecutor elicited
testimony from Thurgood that he arrested Byrd, provided him with
his rights per Miranda, and asked him if he wanted to talk.
replied yes.

Byrd

However, in the face of police interrogations, Byrd

declined to make a statement. (R. 483-88; 529-32.)
10

In addition,

during Byrd's cross-examination, the prosecutor specifically
questioned Byrd about his refusal at the time of the arrest to
make a statement to officers.

(R. 600-01.)

The prosecutor's

comments and questions specifically and clearly referred to
Byrd's silence, thereby demonstrating prejudice under the first
factor set forth in Reyes.

The prosecutor engaged in the line of

questions concerning Byrd's silence in order to impeach him and
to highlight the fact that for whatever reason, Byrd declined to
give the officers his version of the events on October 12, 1993.
Byrd's refusal to talk to the officers could be seen as
inconsistent with his defense that he was not the buyer in the
transaction, and did not stash the drugs beneath the car seat.
With regard to the second factor in Reyes, the state's case
was based on a video of an ambiguous exchange taking place at a
distance through the passenger-side window of a car (R. 373;
state's trial Exhibit 1 ) , Grant's testimony that he observed from
a distance an exchange of some kind (R. 369-73; 395-400), and
Thurgood's incredible testimony that Byrd confessed to buying
drugs.

(R. 489-90.)

According to Thurgood, he transported Byrd to the jail, a
distance of four blocks (R. 511), and as he "pull[ed] up to the
jail doors" he initiated a conversation with Byrd, stating,
"What's up, what's going on?"

(R. 489-90.)

Byrd allegedly

responded to the small talk with a statement that he purchased
drugs at Pioneer Park.

(Id.)

Thurgood did not reply to Byrd's

alleged statement and made no attempt to preserve it.
11

He simply

noted the alleged confession in his police report.
Byrd denied making any such confession.

(R. 516-19.)

(R. 573-76.)

The confession evidence hinges on credibility; the remainder
of the evidence against Byrd is inconclusive and not overwhelming.

If the jurors concluded Byrd was not credible, their

conclusion likely was based on the fact that Byrd did not defend
himself to the officer during the post-arrest interrogation.
Evidence of Byrd's post-arrest silence prejudiced him.
The danger is that the jury is likely to assign much
more weight to the defendant's previous silence than is
warranted. And permitting the defendant to explain the
reasons for his silence is unlikely to overcome the
strong negative inference that the jury is likely to
draw from the fact that the defendant remained silent
at the time of his arrest.
U.S. v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975) . The jurors' conclusions
in this case were based on their weighing of conflicting evidence
-- Byrd's testimony versus Thurgood's testimony.

Thus, the

likelihood that the jurors were improperly influenced by the
prosecutor's questions concerning Byrd's post-arrest silence is
significant.

Indeed, the jurors likely relied on that evidence

to interpret and weigh Byrd's version of the events.
Under the third factor in Reyes, the Court considers whether
the reference to the defendant's post-arrest silence was an
isolated incident.

In this case the prosecutor referred to the

post-arrest silence both during the state's case-in-chief and
during the defendant's case.

The reference was not isolated.

With regard to the fourth factor in Reyes, during both the
state's case-in-chief and Byrd's cross-examination, when the
12

prosecutor asked about Byrd's post-arrest silence, Byrd's counsel
immediately requested a bench conference, made objections on
constitutional grounds, and moved for a mistrial.
659-60; 171-87.)

(R. 528-29;

The trial court declined to consider the motion

until after the jury commenced deliberations.

(R.

657-58.)

Although the trial court had the opportunity to admonish the jury
to disregard the prosecutor's comments and the evidence
concerning the post-arrest silence, the trial court failed to do
so.

The trial court should have taken some measure to ensure

that the jury avoided, as far as possible, the fact that Byrd
declined to respond to the officer's post-arrest interrogations.
The trial court failed in this endeavor, thereby influencing the
outcome of the case.
Use of Byrd's post-arrest silence for impeachment purposes
created an inference of guilt and violated his due process rights
and his protections against self-incrimination under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and
art. I, sees. 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution.
When a person under arrest is informed, as Miranda
requires, that he may remain silent, that anything he
says may be used against him, and that he may have an
attorney if he wishes, it seems to me that it does not
comport with due process to permit the prosecution
during the trial to call attention to his silence at
the time of arrest and to insist that because he did
not speak about the facts of the case at that time, as
he was told he need not do, an unfavorable inference
might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony
. . . . Surely Hale was not informed here that his
silence, as well as his words, could be used against
him at trial.
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 183 (1975) (J. White,
13

concurring).

it is impossible to know the full impact on the

jury of the prosecutor's comments concerning Byrd's post-arrest
silence.

The evidence against Byrd was inconclusive and

conflicting, as set forth above in connection with the second
factor in Reyes.

The jury likely drew an unfavorable inference

from Byrd's post-arrest silence.

It is reasonably likely that

without the occurrence of prosecutorial misconduct, the results
would be different.

Because Byrd was prejudiced by the comment,

his conviction must be vacated.
POINT II. THE STATE FAILED TO PROVIDE CONTINUING
DISCOVERY AND TO CORRECT MISINFORMATION REPORTED TO THE
DEFENSE BY THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER.
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, "imposes a duty
on the prosecutor to provide discovery material to the defense on
request.

This duty is continuous and applies whether a

prosecutor is responding to a court order or is voluntarily
producing information."

State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 1232, 1242-

43 (Utah), cert, denied, 126 L.Ed.2d 427 (1993) (prosecutor
violated duty by failing to disclose that substance of witness'
testimony had changed on the eve of trial from that contained in
pretrial interviews); State v. Kallin. 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah
1994) (the state has the duty to comply with discovery requests
fully and forthrightly).
[W]hen the prosecution chooses to respond voluntarily
to a request under subsection (a)(5) [of the Utah Rules
of Criminal Procedure] without requiring the defense to
obtain a court order, considerations of fairness
require that the prosecution respond to the request in
a manner that will not be misleading.
*

*

•

[W]hen the prosecution agrees to produce any of the
14

material requested, it must continue to disclose such
material on an ongoing basis to the defense.
Therefore, if the prosecution agrees to produce certain
specified material and it later comes into possession
of additional material that falls within that same
specification, it has to produce the later-acquired
material.
State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 916 (Utah 1987).
For discovery purposes,

,f

[i] nformation known to police

officers working on a case is charged to the prosecution since
the officers are part of the prosecution team.

Neither the

prosecutor nor officers working on a case may withhold
exculpatory evidence or evidence valuable to a defendant."

State

v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984).
Failure of the police to reveal such material evidence
in their possession is equally harmful to a defendant
whether the information is purposely, or negligently,
withheld. And it makes no difference if the
withholding is by officials other than the prosecutor.
The police are also part of the prosecution, and the
taint on the trial is no less if they, rather than the
State's Attorney, were guilty of the nondisclosure.
Barbee v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th
Cir. 1964) .
In this matter, Byrd made a timely request for the discovery
of all police reports and investigations.

The state provided

reports prepared by Thurgood and represented that Kaufman did not
submit written papers in connection with the incident.

Thus, the

state arranged for defense counsel to interview Kaufman by
telephone two days before the trial.

(R. 465-68.)

Kaufman

provided defense counsel with a telephonic pretrial statement
concerning the search of the car - - h e stated he did not search
the car.

(R. 419-20.) At trial, he testified in a manner that

15

was materially inconsistent with his earlier, pretrial statements
-- he testified that he searched the entire car.

(R. 416-17.)

Kaufman admitted that he failed to advise defense counsel of the
material change in his testimony.

(R. 132.)

Because Kaufman and the state failed to notify defense
counsel of the material change, counsel made representations
during opening statements based on Kaufman's pretrial
misrepresentations.

During the state's examination of Kaufman at

trial it became clear that defense counsel presented a theory to
the jury that did not conform to the evidence, thereby directly
placing the credibility of the defense in issue.

Had the state

provided Byrd's counsel with a summary of Kaufman's changed
statement, Byrd's counsel could have altered and salvaged the
defense, by focusing solely on the state's failure to investigate
and search the other occupants of the car, without putting the
credibility of the defense in issue.

Byrd's entire trial

strategy was thwarted by the state's failure to disclose the
change in Kaufman's testimony. The state's failure to update and
supplement the discovery information prior to trial hampered
Byrd's ability to fully and fairly prepare for trial.
Although the trial court had at its disposal the power to
obviate any prejudice resulting from the state's breach of the
discovery rules, the trial court in this matter failed to take
curative measures or to impose sanctions against the state.

Utah

R. Cr.n. P. 16 (g) ("If at any time during the course of the
proc^eiings it is brought to the attention of the court that a
16

party has failed to comply with this [discovery] rule, the court
may . . . enter such [order] as it deems just under the
circumstances").

The trial court could have barred the state

from presenting the conflicting evidence, admonished the jury to
disregard Kaufman's testimony where it was inconsistent with the
defense's theory of the case, or granted a new trial.

Instead,

the trial court permitted the state to present the testimony.
The state's conduct undermined the purpose of the discovery
rules, that is the elimination of unnecessary technicalities and
the removal of the element of surprise or trickery so that the
parties and the finder of fact could determine the facts and
resolve the issues directly, fairly and as expeditiously as
possible.

See Ellis v. Gilbert, 429 P.2d 39 (Utah 1967).

[A] criminal proceeding is more than an adversarial
contest between two competing sides. It is a search
for truth upon which a just judgment may be predicated.
Procedural rules are designed to promote that
objective, not frustrate it. When a request or an
order for discovery is made pursuant to [the discovery
rules], a prosecutor must comply. To meet basic
standards of fairness and to ensure that a trial is a
real quest for truth and not simply a contest between
the parties to win, a defendant's request for
information which has been voluntarily complied with,
or a court order of discovery must be deemed to be a
continuing request. And even though there is no courtordered disclosure, a prosecutor's failure to disclose
newly discovered inculpatory information which falls
with the ambit of [the discovery rules], after the
prosecution has made a voluntary disclosure of evidence
might so mislead defendant as to cause prejudicial
error.
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 662 (Utah 1985).

The supplemental

discovery information was improperly withheld from the defense in
violation of Rule 16(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
17

A review of the record reflects that if the information had
been provided to the defense, counsel could have prepared and
presented the case to the jury in a manner that was consistent
with the evidence presented at trial, without drawing attention
to issues that later proved to be unsupported by the evidence.
The defense was not given the opportunity to fully and fairly
prepare its case.

In addition, Byrd's counsel was forced to

abandon the defense theory of the case as presented to the jury
in opening statements, and to restructure the defense theory in
the middle of trial, thereby compromising the integrity of Byrd's
defense.

The state's failure to inform the defense of Kaufman's

change in testimony prejudiced Byrd.

Salt Lake City v. Reynolds,

849 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
CONCLUSION
Inasmuch as the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by making
reference to Byrd's post-arrest silence, and failed to advise
defense counsel that a witness' testimony had changed since
discovery, Byrd is entitled to a vacation of the conviction and a
new trial void of misconduct.
SUBMITTED this kit-

day of

r*^*..-^

1996.

LINDA M. JONES A
JUDITH A. JENSEN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM B

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 16. Discovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney «hfl11 make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and
places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has M e d to comply with this rule, the
court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;
(6) permit the taking of samples of blood, hair, fingernail scrapings,
and other bodily materials which can be obtained without unreasonable
intrusion;
(7) provide specimens of handwriting;
(8) submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection of his body; and
(9) cut hair or allow hair to grow to approximate appearance at the
time of the alleged offense.
Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the time and place of such appearance shall
be given to the accused and his counsel. Failure of the accused to appear or to
comply with the requirements of this rule, unless relieved by order of the
court, without reasonable excuse shall be grounds for revocation of pre-trial
release, may be offered as evidence in the prosecutor's case in chief for consideration along with other evidence concerning the guilt of the accused and
shall be subject to such further sanctions as the court should deem appropriate.

Art. I

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

